Academy of Management Journal (2010)

Author: Geletkanycz, M.A.., & Boyd, B.K.

Date: 2010

Title: CEO outside directorships and firm performance: A reconciliation of agency and embeddedness views


This study addresses the debate surrounding CEO outside board service and its contribution to firm performance.  Agency scholars contend CEO outside directorships constitute a form of managerial opportunism that potentially distracts from internal responsibilities, while embeddedness scholars argue outside directorship ties afford access to information and resources of important strategic utility.  In an effort aimed at reconciliation, we propose and test a mid-range, contingency-based model receiving strong support in analysis of more than 400 Fortune firms.  Results show CEO outside directorships are positively related to the long-term performance of firms facing competitive constraints on growth.  They also benefit strategically-focused firms more than highly diversified ones.  Implications for research and practice are discussed.


agency theory

boards of directors

contingency models

structural models


Resources: Powerpoint presentation